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CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL
PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
ADMISSIONS
Arval A. Morris*
INTRODUCTION
Two state supreme courts, in Washington and California,
have reached diametrically opposed conclusions on the consti-
tutionality of special admissions preferences for minority appli-
cants to professional schools. In Bakke v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California,' by a vote of six to one, the California
Supreme Court held that a racially conditioned admissions
procedure used by the University of California at Davis Medi-
cal School violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. It said that the medical school's minority
preference "violates the constitutional rights of non-minority
applicants because it affords [admissions] preference on the
basis of race to persons who, by the University's own stand-
ards, are not as qualified for the study of medicine as non-
minority applicants denied admission."2 The opposite conclu-
sion was reached by the Washington Supreme Court in
DeFunis v. Odegaard,3 by a vote of seven to two, holding that
it was constitutionally permissible for the University of Wash-
ington School of Law to grant an admission preference solely
on the ground of race to applicants from minority groups even
though the applicants were not "disadvantaged" and even
though it resulted in the exclusion of better qualified non-
minority applicants. This article shows that the position taken
by the California Supreme Court in Bakke is analytically un-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1951, The Colorado College;
M.A., 1952, J.D., 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., 1958, Yale University; LL.D.,
1972, Colorado College.
1. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), modified, 18 Cal. 3d 252b (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811).
2. Id. at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683. Thus, one of the grounds for
decision seems to be that a valid claim to a denial of equal protection is presented
whenever a person-in this case a Caucasian-suffers any detriment or loss due to a
state's explicit use of a racial criterion. That, to say the least, is questionable. See note
45 infra; Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976).
3. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, .507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and
remanded per curiam as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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sound and its effect on admissions procedures would be unde-
sirable.
Racial preferences in higher education primarily are the
result of a desire to eradicate self-perpetuating racial under-
classes from American society. All reasonable persons will
agree that, collectively, members of certain racial groups, such
as American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, and Asian Americans,
are born with ranges of natural intelligence and innate abilities
fully equal to those of whites.4 But for many reasons these
groups historically have been and currently are seriously un-
derrepresented in high executive and political offices, in the
medical5 and legal professions, and throughout the desirable
positions in American society. The continuing and systematic
underrepresentation of these racial groups shows them to con-
stitute discrete, self-perpetuating racial underclasses, a condi-
tion which is neither desirable nor consistent with the ideals of
America's representative democracy. This social condition re-
quires attention, and its amelioration requires professional and
other higher education for the academically qualified members
of the self-perpetuating racial underclasses.
The task of accelerating that change is made more difficult
today because there are simply far too many well-qualified
applicants for the number of available places in higher educa-
tion, and because the academically qualified members of these
racial groups will seldom be the most qualified due to the hand-
icaps that accompany being a member of a racial underclass.
In these circumstances, a university desiring to help racial
groups break free from their self-perpetuating underclass sta-
tus has a number of alternatives. It might reasonably choose
an admissions programs which granted a preference only to
academically qualified members of the self-perpetuating racial
underclasses who are "disadvantaged," excluding the few
members of the racial underclass who have "made it" in Amer-
ican society. This type of preferential racial classification is
similar to that used by the Davis Medical School which was
adjudicated in Bakke.
4. See, e.g., Block & Dworkin, IQ Heritability and Inequality (Pts. 1-2), 3 & 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 331, 40 (1974) (and sources cited therein); L. EHRMAN, G. OMEN &
E. CASPARI, GENETICS AND ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL
Poucv (1972).
5. "The total number of blacks, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and
mainland Puerto Ricans enrolled in medical schools between 1969 and 1974 was only
8 per cent. (Ass'n. of American Medical Colleges, Medical School Admission Require-
ments (1976) Table 6-C, p. 52.)" Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d at 52
n.19, 553 P.2d at 1164 n.19, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692 n.19. But what really counts, of
course, is not how many members of these groups are admitted to various kinds of
professional education but how many actually wind up in the professions.
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The university might also grant an admissions preference
to all academically qualified members of racial underclasses,
including those few who have "made it," dropping the
"disadvantaged" criterion. If the deprivations of the underclass
have been so great that too few, academically qualified but
"disadvantaged" members can be found, or if it is determined
by the university that all members of specified racial under-
classes bring a desirable characteristic to the educational pro-
cess, then it would appear reasonable for a university to extend
its racial admissions preference to all academically qualified
members of self-perpetuating racial underclasses. This second
type of approach is similar to that adjudicated in DeFunis.
Although the use of a preferential racial classification in
a university's special admissions program in each of the above
two situations may be quite reasonable, the issue of their con-
stitutionality poses questions more difficult than that of select-
ing an efficacious means to help eradicate self-perpetuating
racial underclasses. It is submitted that Bakke was wrongly
decided. Initially, it appears that Bakke failed to meet the
burden of establishing his federal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the special admissions program at Davis
Medical School and that the California Supreme Court did not
adequately address this issue. The court also erred in holding
that the medical school's special admissions program was un-
constitutional. In its rush to judgment, the court improperly
used the fourteenth amendment to strike down the program,
failing to consider the dominant purpose of the framers of that
amendment which was to achieve for blacks and other minority
groups, freedom from their racial underclass status by obtain-
ing their equality with whites, and not to further impede it.
Furthermore, the Bakke court's application of the strict
scrutiny test is erroneous and frought with difficulties. Bakke
is most probably not an appropriate case for the application of
this test. The discrimination involved is clearly not invidious,
in the sense required by prior decisions, nor is Bakke-in con-
trast with DeFunis-a case where the classification is based
6. I do not seek to determine whether a university's racially conditioned preferen-
tial admissions system might violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (see Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975)(motion denied that would have dismissed white plaintiff's § 1981 challenge to Sears
Roebuck's. special internship program for minority persons)), nor whether it might
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1970));
see McDonald v. Santa Fe. Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976). See also Flanagan
v. Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
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solely on race. More serious is the article's claim that close
analysis shows that the Bakke court misapplied the strict scru-
tiny test, using it in an unorthodox and unwarranted fashion.
Finally, the article examines alternatives to racial prefer-
ences in higher education admissions. It is concluded that if
candor and directness are to prevail, then racial preferences are
necessary to bring about the goal of breaking down self-
perpetuating racial underclasses. Nonracial criteria, such as
the alternatives suggested by the Bakke court, if applied liter-
ally and honestly, would not achieve this goal. On the other
hand, any university desiring to pursue the goal of eradicating
racial underclasses can actually retain its racially preferential
admissions standards cloaked behind nonracial criteria ap-
proved by Bakke.
THE BAKKE DECISION: THE FACTS, STANDING, AND THE HOLDING
Allan Bakke, an aerospace engineer and a Caucasian,
twice applied for admission to the School of Medicine of the
University of California at Davis-once in 1973 when there
were 2,644 applicants and once in 1974 when 3,737 persons
applied. Only 100 places were annually available in the medi-
cal school's entering class. That makes the competition for
admission close to 37 to 1 for 1974, with the consequence that
for each successful applicant there necessarily would be thirty-
six who would be disappointed, most of whom would also be
qualified. Bakke was among those denied admission each year
he applied. He neither asked for, nor received, consideration
under the special admissions program,7 nor was he admitted to
7. Although all specially admitted applicants were initially screened as to their
"disadvantage," the 1973 special admissions program differed from that of 1974 in that
in 1973 the application form asked only whether an applicant desired special consider-
ation because he was "from economically and educationally deprived background,"
but in 1974 the applicant was asked to identify his racial or ethnic group and "whether
he wished to be considered an applicant from a minority group." Bakke v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d at 42, 553 P.2d at 1156, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684. Bakke could
have applied for special consideration as other Caucasians did; however, no Caucasian
was ever specially admitted. The trial court found that "members of the white race
were barred from participation" in the special admissions program, and, on appeal,
the university did not challenge this finding. Id. at 44, 553 P.2d at 1159, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 687. Thus, although the special admissions program purported to be one for
"educationally or economically disadvantaged" students, including whites, and al-
though Bakke could have applied under it, the California Supreme Court made noth-
ing of these facts because "applicants who are not members of a minority are barred
from participation in the special admission program." Id. In sum, the program func-
tioned as one of special admission for disadvantaged students from certain minority
[Vol. 17
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any other medical school.
Sixteen of the 100 available places8 were reserved by the
medical school and filled with specially admitted racial under-
class applicants who were also disadvantaged.' The remaining
84 places were assigned to applicants "by recourse to the nor-
mal admissions process."'" Given the admission pressure from
extremely well-qualified applicants, most of whom are from at
least middle class families and have been afforded society's
finest educational opportunities, it is unrealistic to expect that
the few minority-group applicants who are academically quali-
fied for the study of medicine, but not excellently so, will be
able to compete successfully for admission with their white,
affluent counterparts. Circumstances of this kind insure the
continuing underclass status of these racial groups, even
though an occasional racial minority member might qualify for
professional school admission." The medical school's reserva-
tion of sixteen positions in each entering class was intended to
ameliorate this condition.
Bakke sued for declaratory and injunctive relief that would
compel his admission, 2 alleging that his denial of admission to
groups, combining racial and socio-economic criteria with those used in the regular
admissions process.
8. "The determination that 16 students would be admitted under the special
program was made by a resolution of the faculty of the medical school. Whether that
figure was randomly selected, or has some rationale, is not revealed by the evidence."
18 Cal. 3d at 38 n.1, 553 P.2d at 1155 n.1, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683 n.1. It is doubtful that
proportional eqality for minorities was the goal because "minorities comprise more
than 25 per cent of the state's population." Id. at 88 n.16, 553 P.2d at 1189 n.16, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 717 n.16.
9. The faculty chairman of the special admission committee ini-
tially screens the applications of those who seek to enter the University
as disadvantaged students, to determine if they may properly be classi-
fied as disadvantaged. Those who do not qualify as disadvantaged are
referred to the regular admissions committee. If a candidate passes this
initial scrutiny, his application is reviewed by the special committee for
the purpose of determining whether he should be invited for a personal
interview. In making this determination the special committee, unlike
the regular committee, does not automatically disqualify an applicant
who has a grade point average below 2.5.
18 Cal. 3d at 42-43, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686. In footnote 8, the court
further described the admissions procedure: "The chairman determines whether an
applicant is disadvantaged by examining his application for such clues as whether he
has been granted a waiver of the application fee, which requires a means test, whether
he worked during school, and the occupational background and edcuation of his par-
ents." Id. at 42, n.8, 553 P.2d at 1158 n.8, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686 n.8.
10. Id. at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (footnote omitted).
11. See notes 158 & 160 infra.
12. In the alternative, he also asked for a writ of mandate directing his admis-
sion, for a show cause order compelling the university to show why it should not be
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the medical school by a state university constituted invidious
racial discrimination against him, denying him the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, he
claimed that he had been denied equal protection (1) because
he was fully qualified for admission; (2) because ultimately,
the sole reason why he was denied admission was that he is a
Caucasian; (3) because the sixteen specially admitted appli-
cants were disadvantaged members of racial minorities pos-
sessing fewer qualifications for admission than Bakke;' 3 (4) be-
cause the applications of disadvantaged members of favored
racial minorities" were judged separately from the "regularly"
enjoined from denying him admission, and for a declaration that he was entitled to
admission. 18 Cal. 3d at 38 n.2, 553 P.2d at 1155 n.2, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683 n.2.
13. The medical school created a combined numerical score for each applicant
who was permitted an interview (815 regular and 71 special applicant interviews
occurred in 1973, and 462 regular and 88 special ones in 1974), the combined numerical
score being based on undergraduate grade point, the Medical College Admission Test
scores, information derived from the application form, letters of recommendation and
the interview.
Bakke had a grade point average of 3.51, and his scores on the verbal,
quantitative, science, and general information portions of the Medical
College Admission Test (expressed in percentiles) were 96, 94, 97 and 72
respectively. His application warranted an interview in both years for
which he applied. In 1973, his combined numerical rating was 468 out of
possible 500, and in 1974 it was 549 out of a possible 600. He was not
placed on the alternate list in either year.
Some minority students who were admitted under the special pro-
gram in 1973 and 1974 had grade point averages below 2.5, the minimum
required for an interview for those who did not qualify under the special
program; some were as low as 2.11 in 1973 and 2.21 in 1974. According to
Dr. Lowrey [Chairman, Admissions Committee], if an applicant scored
lower than the 50th percentile in the science and verbal portions of the
Medical College Admissions Test, the committee "would look very hard
at other things that would be positive" such as motivation, or some
explanation for his low scores. The mean percentage scores on the test of
the minority students admitted to the 1973 and 1974 entering classes
under the special program were below the 50th percentile in all four areas
tested. In addition, the combined numerical ratings of some students
admitted under the special program were 20 to 30 points below Bakke's
rating.
Id. at 43-44, 553 P.2d at 1158-59, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
14. Apparently, the special admissions program operationally favored only dis-
advantaged applicants who identified themselves as Black/Afro-American, American
Indian, Mexican American or Chicano, and Oriental/Asian American. Id. at 40 n.4,
553 P.2d at 1156 n.4, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684 n.4. It should be noted that "between 1970
and 1974, while the program was in operation, 33 Mexican Americans, 26 blacks, and
1 American Indian" (Id. at 54, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693) and 12 Asians
were admitted. Id. at 54 n.21, 553 P.2d at 1165 n.21, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693 n.21. "Six
Mexican Americans, 1 black and 41 Asians were admitted between 1970 and 1974,
without the aid of the program." Id.
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admitted students, 5 and under less rigorous standards,"6 and(5) because the final result was state action using racial classi-
fications to admit racial minority applicants to the study of
medicine who were less qualifed 7 than Bakke. 8
The university cross-complained, requesting declaratory
relief and alleging, inter alia, that all applicants admitted to
medical school, disadvantaged minority and nonminority stu-
dents alike, were fully qualified for the study of medicine 9 and
asking that the court rule that the university's special admis-
sions program was not an unconstitutional means of achieving
its compelling ends; namely, to integrate the medical profes-
sion, to eliminate racial stereotypes, to improve the delivery of
medical services to self-perpetuating racial underclasses, and
"to promote diversity in the student body and the medical
profession, and to expand medical education opportunities to
persons from [self-perpetuating racial underclasses having]
economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds."2 0
15. The selection of students for admission is conducted by two
separate committees. The regular admission committee consists of a vol-
unteer group of 14 or 15 faculty members and an equal number of stu-
dents, all selected by the dean of the medical school. [In 1973 there were
more faculty members than students on this committee, but their num-
bers were equal in 1974.] The special admission committee, which evalu-
ates the applications of disadvantaged applicants only, consists of stu-
dents who are all members of minority groups, and faculty of the medical
school who are predominantly but not entirely minorities. Applications
from those not classified as disadvantaged (including applications from
minorities who do not qualify as disadvantaged) are screened through the
regular admission process. The evaluation of the two groups is made
independently, so that applicants considered by the special committee
are rated only against one another and not against those considered in
the regular admission process. All students admitted under the special
program since its inception in 1969 have been members of minority
groups.
Id. at 41, 553 P.2d at 1157, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
16. See notes 7, 9 & 13, supra.
17. See note 11 supra.
18. Bakke did not challenge the preference accorded to applicants from northern
California who planned to practice there; apparently no geographical preferences were
granted in either 1973 and 1974. 18 Cal. 3d at 42 n.7, 553 P.2d at 1158 n.7, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 686 n.7. Nor did he complain about the preference that may be given to "an
applicant whose combined rating was 'quite high' but not sufficient for admission but
who is married to an applicant previously accepted." Id. at 42, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 686.
19. The truth of this allegation, although admitted, was deemed insignificant by
the Bakke court: "The fact that all the minority students admitted under the special
program may have been qualified to study medicine does not significantly affect our
analysis of the issues." Id. at 48, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
20. Id. at 39, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
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Bakke's Standing
The trial court ruled against the university and in favor of
Bakke, but it denied the injunction that would have ordered
Bakke's admission because "he would not have been selected
even if there had been no special program for minorities." '
Given that finding, it is difficult to identify Bakke's standing
interest and the harmful invasion of that interest by the medi-
cal school's special admissions program that justifies Bakke's
right to invoke judicial power to challenge the program in the
first instance, and similarly, to understand why both the trial
and supreme court did not dismiss Bakke's complaint on that
ground.
Bakke's application was considered by the medical school
under is regular admissions procedures wherein "[tlwo out of
three applicants offered admission . . . ultimately enroll at the
University." Because only two-thirds of the offers under the
regular admissions process are accepted, other applicants
"whose ratings will bring special skills or balance to the enter-
ing class" or those "whose ratings approximate those admitted
may be placed on an alternate list," but Bakke's application
"was not placed on the alternate list in either year.""3 In short,
Bakke failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
against himself. Perhaps he could have done so by showing
that, but for the sixteen places alloted to the special admissions
program, his application at least would have been placed on
the alternate list, as was the application of Marco DeFunis
in the celebrated DeFunis case. 4 But Bakke did not, and the
burden of showing his standing was solely his. It appears that
Bakke's only standing interest lies in the fact that he applied
to medical school and was denied admission. It was not shown
that Bakke's failure to gain admission could be attributed to
the medical school's racially preferential admissions program.
Bakke's failure to make the necessary showing may prove
fatal to review in the United States Supreme Court," even
21. Id. at 39, 553 P.2d at 1156, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
22. Id. at 42, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
23. Id. at 42-43, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
24. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and
remanded per curiam as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); see Morris, Equal Protection,
Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions: "DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard, "49 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1973); Morris, Equal Educational Opportunity, Constitu-
tional Uniformity and the "DeFunis" Remand, 50 WASH. L. REV. 565 (1974).
25. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 44 U.S.L.W. 4724 (1976);
[Vol. 17
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though the "University concedes, as it did before the California
Supreme Court, that. . . it cannot prove that Bakke would not
have been admitted in the absence of the special admissions
program at the Davis Medical School,""s and even though the
California Supreme Court, when it denied a rehearing,
amended its original decision and ordered Bakke to be admit-
ted immediately. In such circumstances, California, of course,
may have standing requirements different from those required
for the exercise of federal judicial power. Nevertheless, federal
standing requirements must be present before Supreme Court
review will ensue. If it finds that there is no federal standing
and if it does not decide the merits of the case, the United
States Supreme Court should vacate the decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and remand the case, as it did in
DeFunis.27 In this way Bakke would not be a precedent even in
the state court."8 Future litigation of this important constitu-
tional issue would, then, not be prejudiced, and, more impor-
tantly, constitutional uniformity would prevail because this
treatment of Bakke would insure that the Constitution would
"have precisely the same construction [and] obligation of effi-
cacy, in any two states."29 If the United States Supreme Court
refuses to decide the merits for some reason such as a lack of
standing, but does not vacate the California decision, then the
amomalous result will be that of constitutional diversity in
circumstances of close, but not exact, similarity-the equal
protection clause having been interpreted to allow the use of
racial preferences for minority group members in law school
admissions in Washington," but having been interpreted to
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
26. Application of Regents of the University of California for Stay Pending Re-
view on Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, at 3 (Nov. 3, 1976).
27. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
28. Remarks by Paul Freund in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 35 (E. Cahn
ed. 1954) arguing against the contrary result as exemplified by Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); see Morris, Equal Educational Opportunity, Constitu.
tional Uniformity and the "DeFunis" Remand, 50 WASH. L. REV. 565, 588-91 (1974).
29. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
30. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and
remanded per curiam as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Technically considered, DeFunis
cannot be precedential in the federal court system because it is a state case and
because the United States Supreme Court vacated its judgment. Its value as precedent
in Washington is less clear because a stalemate occurred on remand to the Washington
Supreme Court. Four justices ignored the vacation of judgment by the United States
Supreme Court and again voted on the merits to reinstate their prior decision andjudgment. Three justices, originally in the majority, refused to reach the substantive
19771
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prohibit the use of racial preferences for disadvantaged minor-
ity group members in medical school admissions in Califor-
nia."
The Holding in Bakke
Proceeding to decide on the merits, the California Su-
preme Court ruled the university's special admissions program
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. In
evaluating the constitutionality of the racial classification
present in the medical school's admissions program, the Bakke
court relied on the strict scrutiny standard of review. The court
assumed that certain "objectives which the University seeks to
achieve by the special admission program meet the existing
standards required to uphold the validity of a racial classifica-
tion insofar as they establish a compelling governmental inter-
est. ' 3 However, the court held that the granting of a racial
preference to certain disadvantaged minorities was an imper-
missible means for obtaining that end because the court was
"not convinced that the University has met its burden of dem-
onstrating that the basic goals of the program cannot be sub-
stantially achieved by means less detrimental to the rights of
the majority. ' 33 The court's decision turned on the means-
related less restrictive alternative test. Because the university
failed to carry its heavy burden of showing that a nonracial
alternative was not available and because it believed reason-
able, nonracial alternatives were avilable to the university,
the court ruled that "no applicant may be rejected because of
race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by
standards applied without regard to race."34
merits again voted that the "DeFunis litigation in its entirety should simply be ren-
dered null and void . . . because the vacation [of the judgment on the federal question
by the United States Supreme Court] simply nullified our State Supreme Court
judgment and everything incorporated in it-including the Trial court judgment." 84
Wash. 2d at 633-34, 529 P.2d at 447.48. The remaining two justices ignored the vaca-
tion and again voted on the merits to reinstitute their original dissent as a dissent from
the plurality opinion of the four justices reinstating the prior DeFunis judgment. Since
five of the nine justices must vote in concurrence on a disposition, then, strictly consid-
ered, there is no law of the case, only a stalemate. See Morris, Equal Educational
Opportunity, Constitutional Uniformity and the "DeFunis" Remand, 50 WASH. L.
REV. 565, 591-94 (1975).
31. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976).
32. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 17
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Continuing, the California Supreme Court expressly ap-
proved all the remaining elements of the medical school's spe-
cial admissions program. It held that "the standards for ad-
mission employed by the University are not constitutionally
infirm except to the extent that they are utilized in a racially
discriminatory manner"35 and that the
University is entitled to consider, as it does with respect
to applicants in the special program, that low grades and
test scores may not accurately reflect the abilities of some
disadvantaged students; and it may reasonably conclude
that although their academic scores are lower, their poten-
tial for success in the school and the profession is equal to
or greater than that of an applicant with higher grades who
has not been similarly handicapped. 6
The court, therefore, substantially adopted the affirmative ac-
tion position advanced by Mr. Justice Douglas in DeFunis3t
and explicitly endorsed the use of "flexible admission stan-
dards ' 38 which, it said, can be coupled with "aggressive pro-
grams to identify, recruit, and provide remedial schooling for
disadvantaged students of all races who are interested in
pursuing a medical career and have an evident talent for doing
so.39
Justice Tobriner adamantly opposed the approach taken
by the majority. Dissenting from the court's holdings, includ-
ing those endorsing a very wide range of admissions standards,
Justice Tobriner accused the majority of retreating "into obfus-
cating terminology," of encouraging "the initial vice of disin-
genuousness," and, in effect, of commanding the medical
school to engage in the "manipulation of labels, so that the
perfectly proper purpose of the [racial preference admissions]
program must be concealed by subterfuge.) 4
THE DOMINANT PURPOSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
When applying the fourteenth amendment, the Bakke
court failed to take proper account of the dominant purpose of
the amendment, which was to assist blacks and other racial
35. Id.
36. Id. at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694 (footnote omitted).
37. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336-37 (1974) (dissenting opinion). See
18 Cal. 3d at 54 & n.23, 553 P.2d at 1166 & n.23, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694 & n.23.
38. 18 Cal. 3d at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 89-90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
1977]
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underclasses to achieve freedom through equality. By immedi-
ately and narrowly focusing on the negative aspect of the four-
teenth amendment, its anti-discrimination principle, the
Bakke court neglected to consider its affirmative purpose of
achieving racial underclass equality. In cases such as Bakke,
the affirmative aspect of the fourteenth amendment is directly
implicated, and it must be construed in light of the social ends
which the framers sought to achieve.
The Framers Did Not Specifically Intend to Prohibit Reverse
Discrimination
"So bizarre would discrimination against whites in admis-
sion to institutions of higher learning have seemed to the fra-
mers of the Fourteenth Amendment that we can be confident
that they did not consciously seek to erect a constitutional
barrier against such discrimination."' That statement by Pro-
fessor Posner undoubtedly is true, and its generates several
propositions governing the proper application of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause to Bakke. It can be safely
stated that the equal protection clause was not specifically
intended by its framers: (1) to rule out the use of racial prefer-
ences in higher education admissions that award advantages to
American Indians or to blacks, or to members of any "self-
perpetuating [racial or other] group at the bottom level of our
society who have lost the ability and the hope of moving
up;"4 or (2) to prohibit government from ever using a racial
classification;43 or (3) to require that when using a racial classi-
fication, the state act only in ways that have racially neutral
consequences." The use of a racial criterion may be appropri-
41. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat-
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 S. CT. REV. 1, 21-22; see Ely, Constitutionality of
Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 723 (1974); Sandalow, Racial Preferences
in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CI. L. REV.
653 (1975); "DeFunis": The Road Not Taken, 60 VA. L. REV. 917 (1974); DeFunis
"Symposium," 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483 (1975).
42. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 374 (1966).
43. Most uses of racial classifications are considered in Vieira, Racial Imbalance,
Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1553
(1969).
44. Compare Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955), with the Supreme Court's declaration in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954), that in "the first cases in this Court construing the
Fourteenth Amendment [The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)],
decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-
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ate, for example, where the only way to prevent further vio-
lence in a prison might be that of separating prisoners along
white and black lines, even though the consequence may be
that of stigmatizing the black prisoners significantly more than
the whites.45
The intent of the framers and the principle of racial neu-
trality has been examined recently by Professor Sandalow.
Relying on current historical research, he states that "the idea
that black and white are equal, that race is not a meaningful
category, did not gain ascendancy until well into the present
century."4 Regarding the idea that the equal protection clause
should be read to prohibit the government from distributing
benefits and costs on racial or ethnic grounds, he concludes
that the history of the fourteenth amendment "does not require
rejection of the principle . . . the point is, rather, that it does
not require adoption of that principle."47 There is no sufficient
reason for doubting the correctness of this view.
The Affirmative Aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment
Although the racial preference question presented in
Bakke may not have been considered by the framers of the
fourteenth amendment, their dominant purpose in enacting
that amendment materially affects the correct resolution of the
issue presented in Bakke. There is general agreement that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment had one dominant and
overriding purpose: to obtain an effective equality for blacks
and for certain other minority racial groups, identical to the
equality enjoyed among whites. An effective equality of rights
was considered a necessary part of being free men.48 It can
imposed discriminations against the Negro race." See generally G. FREDERICKSON, THE
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 325-32 (1971).
45. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (concurring opinion) (per
curiam). The concurring opinion of Justices Black, Harlan and Stewart specifically
emphasizes "that prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particu-
larized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security,
discipline, and good order in prisons and jails." Id.
46. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 664 (1975).
47. Id. at 665.
48. After exhaustive inquiry Professor Charles Fairman concludes that the
"Fourteenth Amendment, in Bradley's apt interpretation [in his Slaughter-House
dissent], expressed a national aspiration that 'every citizen of the United States might
stand erect in every portion of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege
belonging to a freeman' and that "[after a century, the nation is stirred anew by a
yearning to attain that goal." C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
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appropriately be stated that the fundamental purpose of the
fourteenth amendment was to achieve equality in the service
of freedom, and to the uplift of subservient and self-perpetu-
ating racial underclasses so they could enjoy the blessings of
freedom. In a significant sense then, the dominant purpose of
the fourteenth amendment can be considered as a type of af-
firmative action by the nation. 9 The framers of the amend-
ment sought to provide the members of racial underclasses
with constitutional equality of opportunity including educa-
tional opportunity, so that by their own actions, they might
end their class's subservience.
Absent attempts to aid a discrete, self-perpetuating under-
class the soundest working rule of the fourteenth amendment
is that, without a compelling justification, race and ethnicity
criteria are not constitutionally relevant and, except for appro-
priate judicially prescribed remedies, and for certain statistical
purposes, government is precluded from using these criteria.
To this extent the Constitution is color blind. The principle of
racial neutrality50 properly prevails as the usual standard for
constitutional adjudication, and assuming that American so-
ciety does not contain any permanent or semi-permanent, self-
perpetuating underclass, it strives to maintain equal access"' to
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, Part I, at 1388 (1971). See K.
STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-77 (1965); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951).
49. The affirmative action aspect of the fourteenth amendment was recognized
by the Supreme Court in the first case in which it construed that amendment. The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Declaring that the affirmative
action aspect of the amendment requires it to be seen in the social context of its times,
the Slaughter-House Court stated:
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too
recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the
most casual examination of the language of these amendments no one can
fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all,
lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would
have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of
the newly made freedman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.
Id. at 71. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
50. For a discussion of this principle, see Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1976); Cohen, The DeFunis Case: Race and the Constitution, 220 THE NATION 135
(1975).
51. Congress has incorporated this principle into certain aspects of recent legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
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society's opportunities. So long as that assumption is valid and
no racial or ethnic underclass exists, a person's race or ethnicity
is not constitutionally relevant.
However, the identification of a racial or ethnic group as
a self-perpetuating underclass changes this state of affairs. In
such circumstances, a person's race or ethnic classification be-
comes a socially significant "characteristic and can assume
constitutional dimensions. In these circumstances, the ques-
tion whether American Indians or blacks, or certain other racial
or ethnic underclass members, are substantially represented in
medical or law school classes, and in the professions and other
societal positions generally, assumes considerable social and
constitutional importance." 2
The reasons why it may be constitutionally correct in cer-
tain circumstances to award a racial preference to qualified
members of a self-perpetuating underclass are: (1) some groups
do not, in fact, enjoy substantially equal rights, resulting in
their becoming or remaining self-perpetuating underclasses;
(2) the existence of a self-perpetuating underclass is inconsist-
ent with the basic constitutional requirements of American
representative democracy; and (3) qualified members of an
underclass are constitutionally entitled to the effective equality
of opportunity enjoyed by other Americans of comparable abil-
ities.
Because race and ethnicity assume significance in these
circumstances, it is spurious to argue, as have some commenta-
52. In these circumstances, the question whether blacks and other
racial and ethnic minorities are substantially represented . ..assumes
considerable importance. Gross underrepresentation of these groups has
consequences quite different from those that would result from, say, the
gross underrepresentation of men with one blue and one green eye or of
left-handed women. Individuals who share these latter characteristics do
not identify with one another. Their associations are not significantly
determined by their common trait. They do not share a distinctive cul-
tural background which may make it easier for them to communicate
with one another than with others. Governmental decisions do not affect
them differently than they affect other persons, and, conversely, their
views on issues of public policy are likely to be distributed in the same
way as in the general population. In all these respects, individuals defined
by these characteristics differ from the members of racial and ethnic
minorities. And it is precisely because of these differences that gross
underrepresentation of the latter . . . poses a significant social problem.
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the
Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 684 (1975); see B. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK
REPARATIONS (1973); Bayles, Reparations to Wronged Groups, 33 ANALYSIS 182, 183(1973); Taylor, Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice, 33 ANALYSIS 177,
179 (1973).
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tors, that ameliorating affirmative action programs that award
racial preferences to qualified members of self-perpetuating
underclasses necessarily are unprincipled. Their argument is
that if, in an attempt to eradicate self-perpetuating under-
classes, either an ethnic or racial admissions preference is
awarded to fully qualified American Indians, blacks, or others,
because they are members of self-perpetuating racial under-
classes, then there can be no stopping point; there can be no
adequate justification for not similarly creating racial prefer-
ences for all other minority groups, such as, say, Lithuanians
or Australians, because there is not a proportionately equal
number of Australians, or Lithuanians found in all of Amer-
ica's professional and other coveted social positions. Ulti-
mately, the argument goes, the practice of awarding an ethnic
or racial preference is self-defeating because America is a so-
ciety made up of members of minority groups and no justifiable
principle exists that precludes everyone a preference if any is
awarded.
There are two short answers to this: first, proportional
equality is per se neither constitutionally allowed nor morally
good.53 Second, although Lithuanians and Australians and
almost all other racial groups constitute a minority, as do mil-
lionaires, they can not properly be identified as a permanent
or semi-permanent, self-perpetuating ethnic or racial under-
class in American society. It is the criterion of a self-
perpetuating underclass that constitutionally justifies and si-
multaneously identifies and limits the use of a racial or ethnic,
or other type of, preference under the "dominant purpose" con-
struction of the fourteenth amendment. Sadly, but truly, most
American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, and Asian Americans
have been severly disadvantaged and find themselves occupy-
ing a status properly identified as that of a self-perpetuating
racial underclass. Moreover, because of this criterion, affirma-
tive action programs that are carefully designed to uplift and
eradicate self-perpetuating underclasses become self-
liquidating as they become successful. They help severely dis-
advantaged people to help themselves and are in the noblest
American tradition.
In summary, it can be said that the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause serves two special functions.
53. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971).
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One of these functions is negative: it requires the government,
particularly the judiciary, to protect all classes and persons,
including racial minority groups, from hostile or detrimental
state action against them which, because the action is purpo-
sive and detrimental, qualifies it as "invidious discrimina-
tion." 4 In this negative dimension, the fourteenth amendment
can be seen as incorporating an anti-discrimination principle,
protecting members of minority groups against purposive state
action that aims to subordinate them and which, if systemati-
cally carried out, would ultimately create a subordinated un-
derclass.
The second and positive dimension of the "dominant pur-
pose" construction of the fourteenth amendment is that it
empowers Congress to legislate affirmatively in order to amel-
iorate the status of persons who Congress properly concludes
are members of self-perpetuating underclasses, and to protect
any subordinated class from becoming a self-perpetuating un-
derclass.5 Clearly, Congress constitutionally is empowered to
enact properly conceived affirmative action programs favoring
underclass members. Because states, through their police pow-
ers, already possessed all powers needed to ameliorate the sta-
tus of persons identified as members of self-perpetuating un-
derclasses, there was no need for the framers of the fourteenth
amendment further to empower states. The important problem
the framers faced was not that the Southern states lacked
power to uplift the condition of a recently freed underclass of
slaves, but that the states refused to exercise their powers in
that way. States were, and are, constitutionally empowered
through their police powers to enact properly conceived affirm-
ative action programs favoring underclass members. It follows
that it would be highly improper, except in the most unusual
and absolutely clear case, for any court to use the fourteenth
54. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
55. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), where the United States
Supreme Court held that the San Franciso school system's failure to provide English
langauge instruction to Chinese students violated section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The Court in Lau expressly approved HEW's guideline
requiring that federally funded school districts in the United States affirmatively act
'to rectify the language deficiency in order to open' the instruction to students who
had 'linguistic deficiencies.' 35 Fed. Reg. 11595." 414 U.S. at 567. Moreover, it appears
that Congress must show only that a rational basis supports its legislation, at least
where Congress benefits one racial group without causing detriment to any other. See,
e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 657-58 (1966).
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amendment as a device to prevent a state from taking the
affirmative action necessary to aid in the general social eleva-
tion of qualified members of self-perpetuating racial under-
classes. In light of the seeds of discontent and potential social
violence sown by the very existence of any self-perpetrating
underclass, the state simply cannot be racially neutral. What
is desperately needed from the state is amelioration of the ma-
ligant social condition by an affirmative action "plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises to work now.""6
The Challenge Presented by Bakke
Given the materially disadvantaged and permanent un-
derclass status of most American Indians, blacks, Chicanos,
and Asian Americans-the racial groups that actually received
the medical school's preference in Bakke-the proper constitu-
tional framework and approach to the equal protection issue in
Bakke required an act of judicial statesmanship. This the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court did not do. The court should have con-
sidered the question presented by Bakke in light of its generat-
ing social considerations and the dominant purpose of the four-
teenth amendment. Moreover, it should have construed the
equal protection clause so as to achieve that purpose by using
the familiar technique of constitutional construction employed
some fifty-seven years ago by the United States Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constit-
uent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we
must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen com-
pletely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they created an organ-
ism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.
The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience, and not merely in that of what was said
a hundred years ago. 7
That the Bakke court did not accept this challenge and
rise to the occasion is only too painfully obvious. The California
Supreme Court did not recognize the human and social sweep
of Bakke's question, and did not explore all the sources of the
56. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
57. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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framers' intent for their general insights and specific revela-
tions of the dominant values and purposes that the fourteenth
amendment sought to achieve. Instead the court turned its
sights to the specifics of equal protection doctrine recently gen-
erated by the United States Supreme Court in cases that pre-
sented materially different issues.
THE PROPER EQUAL PROTECTION TEST
Because of lack of success in the Supreme Court during its
first seventy-five years the equal protection clause was not seri-
ously relied upon by lawyers as a means for invalidating state
laws; this provoked Justice Holmes to characterize the clause
as "the usual last resort of consitutional arguments."58 Two
learned commentators later wrote that "nothing in the annals
of our law better reflects the primacy of American concern with
liberty over equality than the comparative careers of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."59 Nevertheless, fortunes change, and during the last
thirty years the equal protection clause has come into its own:
it has recently been the subject of some of the most significant
constitutional litigation,"0 and has generated the equal protec-
tion doctrine upon which the Bakke court focussed.
When deciding whether a law violates the equal protection
clause, the Supreme Court looks, in essence, to three things: (1)
the character of the law's classification; (2) the valid individual
interest affected by the law; and (3) the governmental interest
advanced in support of the law's classification." Over the
years, the Court has evolved more than one test, or standard
of review, for equal protection cases, depending upon its char-
acterization of the interest affected, or the classification in-
volved, or the classification's context. Thus, the first important
question in Bakke, or in any equal protection case, is for a court
to select the proper standard of review.
58. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
59. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
60. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. 18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690. See also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
62. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 300, 335 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968).
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The Rational Basis Test
The traditional standard used by courts to review the con-
stitutionality of legislation is the rational basis test. Its appli-
cation requires only that the government show that there is a
rational basis for the challenged classification. If the govern-
ment can show that the classification under attack can reason-
ably be believed to further a legitimate state end, then the
classification is upheld because it bears a rational relationship
to some legitimate legislative objective.63 The minimum judi-
cial scrutiny of a law's classification under this traditional
standard is exemplified by McGowan v. Maryland: "The con-
stitutional safeguard is offered only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective.. . . A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.""
The legislative body need not have conceived of the justifying
set of facts; it is sufficient if a court can. Given the wide scope
of legislative discretion afforded by the rational basis standard
of judicial review, almost amounting to judicial abdication of
review, it is not necessary to determine whether any feasible
but less drastic alternatives to a state's classification exist.
The United States Supreme Court historically has invoked
the rational basis test in equal protection cases when it has
characterized legislation as presenting economic problems,15
even though serious human issues" involving socio-economic
inequalities are also involved." The court has consistently
found a rational basis for economic legislation. However, in
several recent cases" not involving economic legislation, the
Court has applied the rational basis test in a stricter fashion,
with more "bite,"" and has found an absence of a reasonable
63. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Goesart
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). Compare, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682, 690 (1973), with Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556,
564 (1947).
64. 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
65. See, e.g., cases cited in note 63 supra.
66. E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
67. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485-86 (1970).
68. E.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
69. "Bite" comes from the proposed standard of review set forth in Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20 (1972).
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relationship70 between the legislation and the end it sought to
achieve.
If, in Bakke, the California Supreme Court had applied
this traditional standard (amounting to almost no judicial
scrutiny) in either its traditional form or with "bite," there is
no doubt that the medical school's preferential admission pro-
gram would have been upheld. The classification utilized in
that program clearly bears a reasonable, indeed, a substan-
tially congruent relationship, to the legitimate state purposes
of (1) helping to eradicate self-perpetuating underclasses; (2)
making educational opportunity available to qualified mem-
bers of the underclasses previously excluded; (3) integrating
the medical school and the medical profession; (4) ameliorating
stereotypes; and (5) providing successful role models for mem-
bers of downtrodden underclasses, thereby raising youthful
aspirations so that the underclass will not continue to be self-
perpetuating.
The Strict Scrutiny Test
The Supreme Court began to develop a stricter standard
of review during the forties.7 This standard developed during
the fifties and sixties72 into what has become known as the
strict scrutiny standard of equal protection review. The Court
has indicated that strict scrutiny of a state's classification is
appropriate, even though it bears a reasonable relationship to
a legitimate state purpose, whenever the state's classification
is based on "suspect" criteria" or burdens "fundamental"
rights.74 Since the Court has decided that there was no funda-
mental right to basic, public school education,75 it is evident"
70. See cases cited in note 68 supra. In several recent cases the Court has used
the due process "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine to rule unconstitutional classifi-
cations which would hAve been upheld if reviewed under the rational basis standard,
and which would not invoke strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
71. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
72. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 -hav. L. Rzv.
1065 (1969).
73. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
74. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to travel).
75. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76. This conclusion is reinforced by court decisions affording universities and
colleges wide ranges of discretion when admitting students. For discussion see Gellhorn
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that the Court would even be less inclined to hold that a funda-
mental right exists to higher education in medicine.7 Hence,
if Bakke is properly to be subjected to strict scrutiny, it is
because its preferential admissions program uses the suspect
criterion of race. This conclusion applies not only to the special
medical school admissions in Bakke, but generally, to all spe-
cial admissions programs in higher education that are based on
race.
Bakke differs from DeFunis. The Supreme Court has held
that "classifications based solely on race must be scrutinized
with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions
and hence constitutionally suspect."" The preferential admis-
sions program of the University of Washington Law School
litigated in DeFunis was based exclusively and solely upon
race.7" That fact, conjoined with the use of race as an exclusion-
ary device, led the Washington Supreme Court to invoke the
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review. 0 For the same rea-
son Mr. Justice Douglas rejected the constitutional validity of
awarding outright and blatant racial preferences,8 ' while going
to great lengths to approve the use of socio-economic, class and
other nonracial criteria."
Although the California Supreme Court failed to analyze
the differences, DeFunis simply is not Bakke. The medical
school's preferential admissions program in Bakke significantly
differs from that in DeFunis. The Bakke program was not
solely based on race as was that in DeFunis. Bakke's program
is based on two separate and distinct standards-socio-eco-
nomic disadvantage and race. Because DeFunis rests solely
and exclusively on exclusionary use of racial classification, it
& Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Procedures and Standards-
Beyond Affirmative Action, 61 VA. L. REv. 975, 992-98 (1974).
77. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976), may moot the constitutional
question if its appliciation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), prohibiting purposeful racial
discrimination by a private school, is extended to the use of racial preferences in higher
education admissions. I believe it would be error to do so since preferential admissions
do not involve purposeful racial discrimination. See text accompanying notes 94-101
infra.
78. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (emphasis added).
79. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and
remanded per curiam as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
80. Id. at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182.
81. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 340-44 (1974). But cf. Morton v. Man-
car, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (upholding a hiring preference while euphemistically
characterizing "American Indians" as a political and not as a racial classification).
82. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 331-32, 334-36, 340-41, 343.
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may have been appropriate to apply the strict scrutiny test in
that case. In order to receive a preference under the DeFunis
program all that an academically qualified applicant needed to
do was declare himself a member of one of the preferred minor-
ity groups. It did not matter, nor did the law school have infor-
mation about, whether the preferred minority applicant was
also disadvantaged or whether the applicant was also one of the
favored few members of the law school's identified minority
groups who had middle or upper class incomes and back-
grounds affording all the privileges equal to similarly situated
whites. 3
That is, the University of Washington Law School
awarded its admissions preference to some persons who were of
the same race as a self-perpetuating racial underclass, but on
racial grounds alone, with the result that some of the recipients
of the law school's racial preference were not disadvantaged;
thus, they fell outside of the scope of the "disadvantaged and
self-perpetuating racial underclass" rationale used in Bakke.
The point is that Bakke is simply not DeFunis all over again,
and the California Supreme Court committed error by treating
them and their constitutional questions as identical, both to be
decided under the strict scrutiny test.
Bakke's preferential admissions program presents one
criterion-the socio-economic criterion of disadvantage-that
favors the application of the traditional rational basis standard
of review.84 However, the racial criterion argues in favor of the
application of the strict standard of judicial review. Bakke's
program is not based solely on race, unlike that of DeFunis,
and contrary to the view of the California Supreme Court, it
does not automatically trigger either the strict scrutiny stan-
dard or the rational basis standard of review. This conclusion
suggests that, perhaps, a third standard should be applied to
Bakke and to similar affirmative action admissions programs
in higher education.85
83. It is not unreasonable for the law school to award preferences to the wealthy
and well-educated who have "made it," so long as they are of the same race as Amer-
ica's self-perpetuating racial underclasses "if preferences are justifiable because they
deal with problems resulting from the continuing social significance of race and ethnic-
ity" because the "preference is granted for the same reason that preference is shown
for exceptionally bright applicants-a judgment that the qualities of the individuals
admitted are likely to make them more useful than those who are excluded." Sanda-
low, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial
Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 691-92 (1975).
84. See generally Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
85. In Bakke the university argued that the rational basis test should apply and
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"Invidious" discrimination. Racial discrimination by gov-
ernment is invidious in the constitutional sense whenever its
purpose is to discriminate on racial grounds, usually in a stig-
matizing way, against members of a racial group. However,
statutes which are fair on their face do not constitute invidious
racial discrimination merely because they have differing im-
pacts on various racial groups."6 Invidious racial discrimina-
tion"7 has been found where the government's purpose was to
racially discriminate against all members of a certain racial
group, by excluding all members from a benefit. For example,
not the strict scrutiny standard because although the special admissions program
excluded some white applicants, they are not stigmatized "in having cast about them
an aura of inferiority." 18 Cal. 3d at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691. While
that is true, it misses the important point that a racial classification can trigger strict
scrutiny. Apparently the university also relied on John Ely's argument that "it is not
,suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority, any majority, to discriminate against
itself." Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv.
723, 727 (1974). But this argument is unconvincing and has been adequately answered.
See Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 569-70 (1975); Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard:
The "Non-Decision" with a Message, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 521, 527 (1975); Sandalow,
Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role,
42 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 693-703 (1975).
86. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976). The Court recently declared "that
official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
discriminatory impact," that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause," and that "[dietermining
whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 97 S. Ct. 555, 563 (1977).
87. The United States Supreme Court has yet to clarify its concept of "racially
discriminatory intention or purpose." The constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams, like those found in Bakke and DeFunis, will turn on the Court's clarification
of this concept. Assuming that a group can properly be said to have an intention or
purpose, there are two ways in which "racially discriminatory purpose or intention"
may be construed in the context of university admissions. First, the Court might hold
that this concept involves a kind of "active" group desire to achieve racial discrimina-
tion. Under this construction a group responsible for university admissions, such as the
Board of Regents or the law or medical faculty, would be found to have a "racially
discriminatory purpose or intention" only if it desired to institute a racially condi-
tioned preferential admissions system for no other reason than to discriminate racially.
The effect of this "desire" construction would be to insulate preferential admissions
systems from the finding that they were adopted with a "racially discriminatory intent
or purpose." Second, the Court might reject "desire" as part of its concept of inten-
tional racial discrimination, and substitute the requirement of an "expectation of a
consequence." Discriminatory racial intent would exist when a group expected that its
action would have racially discriminatory consequences. There is, then, the question
whether the "expectation" must be by a mere probability or to a substantial certainty.
If the "expectation" need only be one that is reasonable under the circumstances, cases
like DeFunis and Bakke would result in a finding that there was a racially discrimina-
tory purpose.
CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
the Supreme Court has found invidious racial discrimination
at the graduate school level when a state used a racial classifi-
cation to exclude all blacks, whether of the same educational
qualifications or not, from enjoying the same specific educa-
tional benefits enjoyed by white students.88 As discussed below,
affirmative action programs in higher education that use a ra-
cial classification differ radically from the prior cases in which
invidious discrimination has been found. The common purpose
of affirmative action programs is neither to segregate nor to
deny higher educational benefits to all members of any racial
group, thereby stigmatizing them. The purpose of such pro-
grams is to integrate and to provide higher educational benefits
to qualified members of all racial groups, thereby helping to
eradicate America's self-perpetuating racial underclasses.
The existence of a self-perpetuating racial underclass im-
pales American society on the horns of an unpleasant dilemma.
One horn is to do nothing and to ignore the plight of members
of self-perpetuating racial underclasses. The glacial rate of
ameliorating change in their social circumstances has led far
too many American Indians, blacks, Chicanos and Asian
American to believe that they and their children have been
consigned by American society to permanent underclass sta-
tus, without hope of ever "moving up," thereby fostering the
perpetuation of the underclass status of these racial groups.
The other horn of the dilemma is to do something, as exempli-
fied by the defendant universities in DeFunis and Bakke. In
order to ameliorate the conditions of members of downtrodden
racial underclasses, government institutions can make an
effective remedial but nonbenign use of racial classifications
preferring qualified minority group members over non-
minority group members with the sad result of excluding quali-
fied persons like DeFunis and Bakke. This is a cruel dilemma.
The problem is one of choosing the lesser evil. It is unfor-
tunate that any qualified applicant is excluded from education.
But the exclusion of a few qualified whites does not exclude a
racial group as a whole and is not as great an evil as that of
continuing the permanent or semi-permanent existence of a
self-perpetuating racial underclass to the peril of our society.
The principle of choosing the lesser evil is one of long standing
88. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
19771
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
in the law. American constitutional law and "the common law
ha[ve] long recognized that in times of imminent peril-such
as when fire threatened a whole community-the soverneign
could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the
property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.""9
Moreover, the Court has "denied [recovery under the fifth
amendment] to the owners of a factory which had been de-
stroyed by American soldiers in the field in Cuba because it
was thought that the structure housed the germs of a conta-
gious disease."10 The task of distributing burdens while seeking
to achieve equal justice in an unequal world for members of
self-perpetuating racial underclasses involves similar consider-
ations and similar judicial choices. This approach applies
equally to our universities and colleges, and clearly, this type
of thinking is not alien to higher education. It is present, for
example, whenever a public university terminates the employ-
ment of a group of professors either because of university reorg-
anization or because of general faculty retrenchment due to a
decided lack of general legislative funding.
Last term the United States Supreme Court took an im-
portant step toward resolving the dilemma presented by the
conflicting interests of members of the majority and victims of
past racial discrimination. In Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Company, Inc., 1 the Court held that under 703(g) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, blacks who had been denied employ-
ment because of racially discriminatory hiring practices, were
entitled to employment with the seniority status which they
presumptively would have attained if their applications had
been accepted. The Court held that the conferral of seniority
status on these victims of racial discrimination was an appro-
priate remedy even though it had the effect of lowering the
seniority ranking of those who had been hired after the plaintiff
blacks had been refused employment. The Court stated that it
was "untenable" that this remedy should be withheld merely
because it would adversely affect the interests of other employ-
ees." The other employees, like Bakke and DeFunis, could not
be blamed for the existence of self-perpetuating racial under-
89. United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
90. Id., citing Juraga Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909).
91. 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976). Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault
on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HAv. L. Rv. 412
(1976).
92. 96 S. Ct. at 1269.
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classes. Nevertheless, they were required to bear part of the
burden incurred in eliminating the effects of past discrimina-
tion.
The greater evil is to do nothing and to await coming of
the social ruptures caused by riots and race war when the
downtrodden racial underclasses finally lash out in anger and
misery. 3 The use of racial preferences to eradicate self-
perpetuating racial underclasses is ameliorating and self-
liquidating as well as restorative of substantial social equilib-
rium to the body politic. It is to be preferred, to the altenative
of doing nothing.
Realistically considered, affirmative action94 programs in
higher education admissions can be divided into two polar
groups. In one of them, a university might use a racial classifi-
cation in order to identify and to admit qualified minority
group members whose admission would be in addition to all
other applicants who normally would have been admitted. The
result of this inclusionary use of a racial classification is that
all of the students are within the educational system, and no
one is excluded. The use of the racial classification has harmed
no one and has furthered the goal of achieving equal educa-
tional opportunity. Its use, therefore, is "benign.""5 Because
this use of the racial classification is inclusionary, nonharmful
and "benign," the Court had indicated that the rational basis
93. See the consequences predicted in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Bantam ed. 1968).
94. Although much used, this term has no generally agreed upon decriptive
content, causiqg much confesion and consternation. In a race or sex context, "affirma-
tive action" can refer to any number of various types of programs designed to aid
women and/or racial minorities, ranging from merely informing them of certain oppor-
tunities to awarding them a benefit such as a promotion or admission to higher educa-
tion, solely because of their status as women and/or members of a racial minority.
Thus, affirmative action programs can operate "inclusively" by merely admitting
people previously excluded or "exclusively" by denying opportunities for admission to
person who do not enjoy a favored status.
95. Kent Greenawalt identifies
four kinds of racial classifications that are arguably "benign" use of race
to integrate as when black pupils are bused to white schools; racial prefer-
ences, . . . denial of a benefit to some members of a minority race to
encourage integration, as when some blacks are denied public housing so
that a "tipping point" will not be reached causing whites to "flee"; segre-
gation by minority wish, as when blacks request and are given a "black
dormitory."
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 570 n.74 (1975). I do not believe it can be shown
that the use of a racial preference in the DeFunis-type situation is "benign" in the true
meaning of that term, i.e., "of mild character, manifesting kindness and
gentleness-not harmful," especially viewed from DeFunis' point of view.
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standard of judicial review would be the test most likely ap-
plied and that its constitutionality most likely would be up-
held." Thus, it is virtually certain that in these circumstances
the Court would rule that a university can constitutionally
employ an inclusionary racial classification within its admis-
sion criteria. However, as will be shown, it is not realistic to
assume that this option is available. 7
A second type of higher education affirmative action ad-
missions program differs radically from the benign type, and
is exemplified in two ways by DeFunis. This second, DeFunis-
type program of special admissions is based exclusively and
solely upon a racial classification, the use of which is necessar-
ily exclusionary of a few members, but by no means of all the
members of a racial group, and hence, this use of a racial classi-
fication definitely is not harmless and "benign."" Indeed, in
this second and nonbenign type of admissions program, a ra-
cial classification is used to prefer and to admit certain favored
minority group applicants to public, higher education in cir-
cumstances where the necessary consequence is that of ex-
cluding other, more academically qualified applicants who,
simply put, are of the "wrong" race. That use, of course, can
be characterized as "institutional"" (as measured by its con-
sequences) but not "purposive" racial discrimination by the
government. The DeFunis-type use of a racial classification is
harmful to the excluded applicant, but not to the applicant's
racial group as a whole; thus, although the intent of the pro-
gram is remedial, the consequences of using the racial classifi-
cation are not properly termed "mild" or "benign." Neverthe-
less, it is clear that the law school's intent in DeFunis, like the
96. In this circumstance and in a public school context, so long as all the students
are included within the educational system, the Court has approved this benign use
of a racial classification, ruling that
school authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formu-
late and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for ex-
ample, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this an educa-
tional policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authori-
ties . ..
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
97. See text accompanying notes 141-50 infra.
98. See note 94 supra.
99. For a discussion of institutional racialism see, R. O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATING
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 99-106 (1975); Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) with Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12 (1976).
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medical school's in Bakke, was not purposefully to discrimi-
nate against anyone.
Although the use of a racial classification in the DeFunis-
type situation cannot be considered "benign," it does not fol-
low that the classification is "invidious." The DeFunis-type
use lacks the ingredient of a racially discriminatory purpose
which the United States Supreme Court has held to be consti-
tutionally necessary for a finding of "invidious" discrimina-
tion. The Court recently ruled that "our cases have not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without
regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose,
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact" and "that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."' 1 The lack of
"invidiousness" is even clearer in Bakke than in Defunis since
Bakke's special admissions program was based on the criteria
of disadvantage as well as race. Yet, in neither DeFunis nor
Bakke was any racial group or any particular person specifi-
cally identified and purposefully treated in a racially stigma-
tizing manner.0 1
The California Supreme Court, along with some commen-
tators, failed to distinguish constitutional problems presented
by an admissions program based on the criteria of disadvan-
tage and race from those presented by an admissions program
based solely on race in a DeFunis-type, nonbenign situation.
The California Supreme Court also failed to distinguish be-
tween a racial classification which is used with a remedial in-
tent and the segregative use of racial criteria with the forbidden
racially discriminatory purpose which enables a court to find
invidious discrimination. 0 The Bakke court used the strict
scrutiny test to hold, in effect, that the university had engaged
in invidious discrimination, but the court did not make the
crucial finding that the university's special admissions pro-
100. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047-48 (1976).
101'. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), the Court held that
the fourteenth amendment protected blacks from government discrimination
"implying their inferiority in civil society" and practically branding them with a stamp
of "inferiority." See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1972).
102. Moreover, the Bakke court erred in relying on a Title VII case when inter-
preting the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that the
legal standards applicable to Title VII cases under the 1964 Civil Rights Act are
different from, and cannot be applied to fourteenth amendment cases. Washington v.
Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047 (1976). Nevertheless, the Bakke court relied on McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976), a Title VII case. 18 Cal. 3d at 51,
553 P.2d at 1164, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
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gram could be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. It
appears to have relied exclusively on the differential impact of
the medical school's admissions program on members of the
Caucasian race in order to find a violation of equal protection
of the laws which, of course, is erroneous. 03 Bakke is an inap-
propriate case for the application of the strict scrutiny test of
equal protection. That standard was advanced by the United
States Supreme Court for application to cases where a state
may actually have a segregative purpose in using a racial clas-
sification.0 4 Such a segregative purpose will create an invidious
use of racial classification unless it is necessary to achieve some
legitimate state interest, the gravity of which is compelling. 03
The strict scrutiny test was not fashioned for cases like Bakke
or DeFunis where, even though a few members of the majority
are excluded, the state's purpose in using the racial classifica-
tion is not segregative, but integrative and remedial.
Since Bakke's special admissions program differs signifi-
cantly from DeFunis' (although both are applied in nonbenign
contexts), since in neither case can a racially discriminatory
purpose ultimately be traced to the university, since in each
case a remedial purpose can be traced to each university, and
since the strict scrutiny test was created for cases where a
racially discriminatory purpose can be traced to a state, it is
most doubtful that the strict scrutiny test should be automati-
cally invoked in Bakke simply because a racial classification is
present in a state university's special admissions program.
The Substantial Interest Test
It would be improper to apply the rational basis test to
Bakke's special admissions program because it is not "benign"
and because its use necessarily involves harm in that some
more academically qualified applicants are denied admis-
sion,00 even though that is not the purpose of racial classifica-
tion. For the same reason, it would be equally improper auto-
matically to invoke the strict scrutiny standard as did the
California Supreme Court. Professor Kent Greenawalt has pre-
sented clear and convincing arguments, which will not be re-
peated here, for using a third standard of judicial review.0 7 The
103. See authorities cited in note 86 supra.
104. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
105. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1968).
106. But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 657-58 (1966).
107. Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
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test is that of a substantial interest. It has recently been ap-
plied by the United States Supreme Court to classification
based on sex.'08 As Professor Greenawalt argues, this test
should be applied to higher education admissions programs
like the type found in Bakke where the admissions preference
is aimed at improving the lot of self-perpetuating racial under-
classes and is not based solely on race.
This test has already been approved by New York's high-
est appellate court in the Alevy'09 case which involved a medi-
cal school admissions program almost identicial to that found
in Bakke:
We are of the view that in deciding an issue of whether
reverse discrimination is present, the courts should make
proper inquiry to determine whether the preferential treat-
ment satisfies a substantial State interest. In determining
whether a substantial State interest underlies a preferen-
tial treatment policy, courts should inquire whether the
policy has a substantial basis in actuality, and is not
merely conjectural. At a minimum, the State-sponsored
scheme must further some legitimate, articulated govern-
mental purpose. However, the interest need not be urgent,
paramount or compelling. Thus, to satisfy the substantial
interest requirement, it need be found that, on balance,
the gain to be derived from the preferential policy out-
weighs its possible detrimental effects.
If it be found that the substantial interest requirement
is met, a further inquiry must be made as to whether the
objectives being advanced by the policy could not be
achieved by a less objectionable alternative; for example,
by reducing the size of the preference, or by limiting the
time span of the practice. Additionally, where preference
policies are indulged, the indulgent must be prepared to
defend them. Courts ought not be required to divine the
diverse motives of legislators, administrators or, as here,
educators.
In sum, in proper circumstances, reverse discrimina-
tion is constitutional. However, to be so, it must be shown
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 579-99 (1975); see Sandalow, Racial Preferences
in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CI. L. REV.
653 (1975).
108. "To withstand constitutional challenge ... classification by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
109. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
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that a substantial interest underlies the policy and prac-
tice and, further, that no nonracial, or objectionable racial,
classification will serve the same purpose.' 0
Although Alevy was argued in Bakke, the California Su-
preme Court refused to adopt A levy's substantial state interest
test, preferring the strict scrutiny standard of review, appar-
ently on the mistaken belief that the issues presented in
DeFunis and Bakke were identical"' and on the mistaken as-
sumption "arguendo, that with minor exceptions the Univer-
sity has demonstrated that the special admission program
serves a compelling state interest, [therefore] conflict between
the language of the New York court and this opinion is more
apparent than real.""' The court is simply in error on both
counts, the first already having been discussed-Bakke's spe-
cial admissions program is not identical to that in DeFunis.
Second, under the compelling interest standard of judicial re-
view the court rigidly applies strict scrutiny to deterime
whether any reasonable but less restrictive alternatives exist.
Strict scrutiny review requires a court to search for alternatives
in a much more rigid and intense way than the substantial
interest test. The court is much more likely to find reasonable
alternatives to existing legislation under the strict scrutiny test
than under the substantial interest test. Under the latter test,
the required interest need be only substantial. This carries with
it a less intense judicial search for alternatives that may be
substituted for the one actually chosen by the state.
BAKKE'S MISUSE OF THE "REASONABLE BUT LESS RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVES" TEST
The Supreme Court has indicated that the strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review should be applied to state classifica-
tions that solely and decisively use suspect criteria in an exclu-
sionary and stigmatizing way-i.e., those based on race,' al-
ienage" or national origin."' To pass the strict scrutiny test, a
110. Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545-46, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
111. 18 Cal. 3d at 48 n.12, 51-52, 553 P.2d at 1162 n.12, 1163-64, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 690 n.12, 691-92.
112. Id. at 60 n.30, 553 P.2d at 1170 n.30, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 698 n.30.
113. Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
114. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
115. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
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state must carry the burden of showing: (1) that a state's racial
classification is "necessary to the accomplishment of some per-
missible state objective"' and (2) that the state has a compel-
ling and and overriding interest in its use of the racial classifi-
cation."' In other words, the classification must be necessary
to reach the state's ends, and those ends must be justified by
compelling state interests. Thus, a court may strictly scruti-
nize the importance of a state achieving its desired end in light
of the undesirability of its classification, or whether the state's
end might equally be achieved by some feasible but less
restrictive alternative-that is, whether the means used by the
state are necessary to achieve its end.
The Bakke court did not decide whether any of the state
interests as argued by the university were compelling as did
the Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis.1"1 Nevertheless,
the California Supreme Court pronounced on the state's ends
by assuming, arguendo, that several of the university's objec-
tives served by its "special admission program meet the exact-
ing standards required to uphold the validity of a racial classifi-
cation insofar as they establish compelling governmental inter-
ests.'"" The ends proposed by the university and accepted by
the court as compelling were: (1) "to integrate the medical
school and the profession;' ' 10 (2) to "influence the student and
the remainder of the profession so that they will become aware
of the medical needs of the minority community and be encour-
aged to assist in meeting those demands;""' (3) to "provide role
models [of minority doctors] for younger persons in the minor-
ity community,""' and to "increase the number of doctors will-
ing to serve the minority community."'' 3 Because the purpose
of the special admissions program was to help eradicate self-
perpetuation of racial underclasses, each of the above compel-
ling interests, accepted by the Bakke court, necessarily is ra-
cially conditioned or strongly oriented to racial considerations.
By accepting these compelling interests, the court acknowl-
edged the racial dimensions of the state's problem. It is strange
116. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967).
117. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
118. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, -, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182-84 (1973).
119. 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
120. Id. at 52, 553 P.2d at 1164, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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that the court rejected two of the ends advanced by the univer-
sity, since the court stated that it "assumed," rather than de-
cided, the compelling nature of the others. The rejected ends
failing to show a compelling state interest were "that minori-
ties would have more rapport with doctors of their own race and
that black doctors would have a greater interest in treating
diseases prevalent among blacks."' 24
Under the strict scrutiny standard, legislative precison in
seeking to achieve compelling ends is essential. A state's clas-
sification-its means-must demonstrate a vastly closer fit
with the state's purpose than under either the rational basis
test or substantial interest test. The requirement of necessity
in the strict scrutiny standard has been equated by the Court
to the "reasonable but less restrictive alternative" doctrine.'25
It was this doctrine that was the basis of the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Bakke.'2
The reasonable but less restrictive alternative doctrine',7
dates from 1821.2 s It is applied in various kinds of litigation
besides that under the equal protection clause.'29 The doctrine
can be formulated in various ways, 3 " but the basic idea is clear:
124. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
125. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
126. 18 Cal. 3d at 56, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
127. See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Pract-
ical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1109-11, 1137-51
(1972); Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1049-
51, 1082-93 (1968); Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic
Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the
Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964); Note, The Less Restrictive Alterna-
tive in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, a Justification, and Some Criteria,
27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969); Note, Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity: First Amend-
ment Immunity from Committee Interrogation, 65 YALE L.J. 1159, 1173-75 (1956).
128. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821).
129. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348, 351 (1973). The less restric-
tive alternative test can also apply to substantive due process cases like Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); to conclusive presumption cases like Cleveland
Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974); to procedural due process cases like
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315-18 (1950); to com-
merce clause cases like Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); and to
first amendment cases like Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
13d. Some of the expressions which have been used are: "less drastic means" in
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); "the reasonable alternative" in Wormuth
& Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964); "the
less intrusive alternative" in Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1048 (1968); "the least intrusive or most effective means" in Bakke v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d at 56, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695;
"precision of regulation" in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); or simply
"necessity" in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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it admits the constitutional legitimacy of the substantive end
that a state is seeking to achieve, but questions whether that
admittedly legitimate end can be achieved through the use of
some alternate means that is less restrictive of a valid individ-
ual interest.
This test has been applied in two ways. The most common
and proper application is to inquire whether there are other
equally efficacious legislative means of accomplishing the
state's end which encroach less on the individual interest than
the law under scrutiny. Recently another application has been
undertaken by the courts: it is asked how well the state's end
is served by the passage of legislation of the type under analy-
sis. A court may conclude that legislation does not sufficiently
promote the end or that other existing laws adequately promote
the state's interest, and hold the legislation under scrutiny is
unconstitutional.
This second application of the reasonable but less restric-
tive alternative test is subject to improper use when a courtjudges whether a state's means sufficiently promotes its ends.
When doing this, a court may be tempted to substitute its
judgment of the importance, or compelling nature, of the
state's end for that of the legislature, rather than limiting its
judgment to whether the classification substantially or rigor-
ously achieves legitimate state objectives. If the court suc-
cumbs to the temptation of makin an ends-related judgment
and if the ends are judged crucially important, then a legisla-
tive measure having a low probability of achieving them will
not be judged to be "too attenuated" and will be upheld. But
if the state's ends are deemed not very important by a court,
then a court will be less inclined to uphold legislation which
encroaches on valid individual interests. This type of decision
properly should be made under the strict scrutiny test when a
court judges whether a state's ends are compelling. It should
not enter into a judgment of whether the state has selected a
reasonable alternative for achieving admittedly legitimate or
compelling state ends. There is no reason why a court, purport-
ing to analyze the means-ends relationship of legislation, can-
not judge whether the means rigorously and strictly achieves
the state's ends.
The "Legislative" Sense of the Test
To be a reasonable alternative in this first and traditional
sense, the less drastic alternative must be successful in maxim-
19771
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
izing all the contested, underlying values. Thus, it must satisfy
two criteria: first, it must actually achieve the admittedly valid
end sought by the state; second, it must achieve the state's
ends while being less restrictive of other valid interests than the
legislation under scrutiny. A court's judgment that a less re-
strictive alternative exists that is more reasonable than the one
actually chosen by the legislature obviously requires close judi-
cial examination of the efficacy of the proferred alternative.
Whenever a court concludes that a less drastic means equally
achieves the state's legitimate end without creating as great an
encroachment on some other constitutinally protected interest,
then the proferred alternative is termed more "reasonable" in
the legislative use of the doctrine, and the actual means pre-
viously chosen by the state is declared unconstitutional.13
The legislative body's subsequent adoption of the court's
more reasonable alternative avoids unnecessary encroachment
upon constitutionally protected interests while simultaneously
allowing the state to achieve its admittedly legitimate end. In
this legislative use, the reasonableness determination functions
to identify a less drastic alternative that enables a state to
achieve its ends, but limits the state's actual choice of means
by eliminating overbreadth in order to accomodate other inter-
ests. The final result sought by the doctrine is the salutary one
of allowing a greater maximization of all the underlying, valid
interests-individual and state. In short, proper application of
the doctrine involves a court in a careful search for more rea-
sonable legislative alternatives while allowing legislative bod-
ies their substantive policy decisions about proper legislative
ends.
The "Contextual" Sense of the Test
In this second and less traditional sense, the use of the less
restrictive alternative test does not trigger a search for more
reasonable legislative alternatives. But rather, it triggers a
strict judicial scrutiny of the contextual efficaciousness of the
means actually chosen by the state. The question usually
stated by the court is: Given the fact that the state's means
encroach on a constitutionally protected interest, are the
means actually chosen by the state necessary to achieve its
admittedly legitimate ends? If the court decides that the
131. An excellent example is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
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means-ends relationship under consideration is "too atten-
uated," or if other existing laws of the state, apart from the one
in question, are judged likely to achieve the state's legitimate
ends, then the law in question unreasonably encroaches upon
the valid individual interest. The means is then declared un-
necessary and unconstitutional, not because a more reasonable
but less drastic alternative exists, but because the court differs
with the legislature on the substantive efficaciousness of the
means actually chosen. An improper application of this test
permits the court to substantively value the end to be achieved
as being less important than did the legislature.
Dunn v. Blumstein132 provides one of the very few exam-
ples of the contextual sense of the reasonable alternative test.
In Dunn, the United States Supreme Court agreed that Ten-
nessee had compelling state interests in eliminating fraud and
in maintaining the purity of its ballot box. To achieve these
ends, Tennessee law contained the usual variety of provisions
governing voter registration and criminal fraud. The law that
was the subject of constitutional attack was a durational resi-
dency requirement. Tennesse argued that its durational resi-
dency requirement was a proper means for achieving the state's
compelling ends because it assured that the voters would be
bona fide residents and that voters would be minimally knowl-
edgeable about the issues and personalities involved in elec-
tions. But Tennessee's durational residency requirement
clashed with the fundamental rights of recent immigrants-the
rights to vote and to travel. Dunn's conflict of a compelling
state interest with an individual's fundamental rights pre-
sented the ingredients necessary for the Court to invoke the
reasonable but less restrictive alternative doctrine in its con-
textual sense.
The Court ruled Tennessee's durational residency require-
ment unnecessary and unconstitutional because (1) many Ten-
nesseans of long residency voted but were less informed about
the issues and candidates than recent migrants; 33 (2) "the re-
cord is totally devoid of any evidence that durational residence
requirements are in fact necessary to identify bona fide resi-
132. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) provides a good,
recent example of the Court employing the substantial interest test. It was held that
a gender classification could not be substituted for more germane bases of classification
because the relationship between the gender classification and the classifications for
which it was substituted was "too attenuated." In other words, there was a lack of
substantial congruence between gender and the more germane bases of classification
that the gender classification purported to represent.
133. 405 U.S. at 358.
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dents;"' 34 (3) most importantly, Tennessee's criminal fraud
and voter registration laws also achieved the state's end of
ballot-box purity;'35 and (4) the durational residency require-
ment encroached on other valid individual interests (the fun-
damental rights to travel and to vote).' 3 The Court ruled that
there was "simply too attenuated a relationship between the
state interest in an informed electorate and the fixed require-
ment"'37 of Tennessee's durational residency requirement. For
this reason the Court was unable to conclude "that durational
residence requirements are necessary to further a compelling
state interest.' ' 3 The Court's discussion focussed on the atten-
tuation between the state's means and its achievement of the
state's admittedly legitimate ends. 139 In Dunn the Court did not
engage in a search for more reasonable legislative alternatives
in the same way as it would have under the legislative use of
the less restrictive alternative test.
Bakke and the Reasonable Alternative Test
The Bakke court relied on Dunn for the case-deciding
proposition that the university must demonstrate "by rigid
scrutiny that there are no reasonable ways to achieve the
state's goals by means which impose a lesser limitation on the
rights of the group disadvantaged by the classification."' 4 ° This
reliance was misplaced because Dunn used the reasonable but
less restrictive alternative test in its contextual sense, while the
California Supreme Court purported to use the test in its
legislative sense."
When, by design or confusion, the California Supreme
Court considered the reasonable but less restrictive alternative
test in its legislative sense, it offered three nonracial alterna-
tives that it approved as realistically feasible legislative substi-
134. Id. at 346.
135. "At least six separate sections of the Tennessee Code define offenses to deal
with voter fraud." Id. at 353.
136. Id. at 336-42.
137. Id. at 360.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 356-60. The Court, in other circumstances, has looked to see whether
a means-ends relationship is "too attenuated." In these circumstances, there need not
be a fundamental right or suspect class present. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). See also,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
140. 18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
141. -1d. at 53-57, 553 P.2d at 1165-67, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693-95.
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tutes for the university's special admissions program: (1) "to
increase the number of places available in the medical schools,
either by allowing additional students to enroll in existing
schools or by expanding the schools;' ' 42 (2) to institute
"aggressive programs to identify, recruit, and provide remedial
schooling for disadvantaged students of all races;"' 4 and (3) to
use "flexible admission standards.' Although offered as a set
of feasible, legislative alternatives equally capable of solving
the university's problem that necessarily carried racial dimen-
sions, the Bakke court ruled that "none of the foregoing
measures can be related to race.' ' 45
The question is whether the court's proferred alternatives
are valid legislative substitutes for the university's special ad-
missions program. When deciding this question, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the means chosen by the
state are valid and permissible, despite competing constitu-
tional claims, if the state's means are "reasonably taken in
pursuit of vital state objectives that cannot be served equally
well in significantly less burdensome ways."'" In short, the
state cannot be required to use means to achieve its ends that
are unrealistic or lacking in effectiveness equal to those ac-
tually chosen by the state.
Justice Tobriner correctly pointed out that the lack of real-
ity in the first of the majority's proferred legislative alterna-
tives discredited its feasibility and that, therefore, it could not
be considered to be equally effective as the state's chosen
means, nor as a reasonable but less restrictive legislative alter-
native:
The majority's alternative suggestion that the integra-
tion of medical schools can be accomplished by increasing
the size and number of medical schools is similarly unreal-
istic. The cost of medical educational facilities is
enormous; absolutely nothing suggests that the necessary
financial commitment for increased facilities will be forth-
coming in the foreseeable future. It is a cruel hoax to deny
minorities participation in the medical profession on the
basis of such clearly fanciful speculation.' 7
142. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974).
147. 18 Cal. 3d at 90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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The same criticism of a lack of reality is equally valid for
the majority's alternative of increasing the number of medical
students without increasing the size or number of medical
schools. America's medical schools are currently filled to their
capacities. Many excellently qualified applicants are denied
admission each year, not because medical faculties are perverse
or prefer to operate medical schools at less than their full ca-
pacities, but rather, because our medical schools are currently
operating at their full student capacities. They simply cannot
admit more students and still deliver the same educational
quality.
The criticism of a lack of realistic effectiveness equally
applies to a literal applicaton of the court's two remaining
alternatives-flexible admissions standards and an aggressive
program to identify, recruit and provide remedial schooling for
disadvantaged students of all races. Neither is individually
tailored specifically to achieve the state's end of attracting dis-
advantaged minority group applicants from self-perpetuating
racial underclasses. If literally and honestly applied, these al-
ternatives would most probably produce many times more dis-
advantaged white applicants than racial underclass appli-
cants. While a much higher percentage of minority group mem-
bers are economically disadvantaged and live below the pov-
erty line, because there are vastly greater number of whites in
this country, many more whites than minority group members
fall below the poverty line. Thus, the great majority of those
qualifying as "disadvantaged" under the Bakke court's alter-
natives would be white. The use of the court's alternatives most
probably would produce many times more white medical stu-
dents, a group already well represented, than the desired
students from self-perpetuating racial underclasses. Thus,
these two alternatives are not true legislative substitutes for
the university's program because they neither recognize nor
meet the racial dimension of the problem that the university
was seeking to solve.
If disingenuosness and manipulation are ruled out, then no
matter how flexible the medical school's admissions standards
might become nor how aggressive its program to identify, re-
cruit and provide remedial schooling for disadvantaged stu-
dents of all races, the court's two remaining alternatives are
unrealistic and not true legislative substitutes for the medical
school's special admissions program. In addition, an important
financial reason was set forth by Justice Tobriner in his dis-
sent:
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Moreover, although the majority speculate that the
broadening of the special admission program to disadvan-
taged applicants of all races will result in approximately
the same amount of integration as the present program,
that conclusion appears untenable on its face. Because all
disadvantaged students need financial aid, the total num-
ber of such students a medical school can afford to admit
is limited. As a consequence, inclusion of all disadvan-
taged students in the special admission program would
inevitably decrease the number of minority students ad-
mitted under the program and thus curtail the achieve-
ment of all integration-related objectives."'
The California Supreme Court stated that it ruled as it did
because it refused to engage in a "sacrifice of principle for the
sake of dubious expediency."'' 4 But, as discussed above, it is
difficult to locate a more principled use of legislative authority
than the university's attempt to help eradicate a self-perpet-
uating racial underclass from American society. Moreover, if
it had heeded its own exhortations about principle and ad-
hered to the principle of consistency, the Bakke court would
have admitted that its proferred legislative alternatives are not
really alternatives at all because they address themselves solely
to a problem quite different from that which was before the
court. The court's alternatives go only to solving a university's
admissions problem presented by academically qualified stu-
dents who are disadvantaged, and the Bakke court meant eco-
nomically, not racially, disadvantaged. It is most unrealistic to
believe that the court's alternatives, designed to solve the prob-
lem of the economically disadvantaged, will in some unex-
plained and mysterious way stimultaneously solve the actual
admissions problem presented to a university by academically
qualified students who are both disadvantaged and members
of a self-perpetuating racial underclass. Fundamentally, it was
a racial problem problem of qualified but disadvantaged mi-
norities found in self-perpetuating underclasses that the medi-
cal school sought to solve through its racially conditioned
148. Id. See, e.g., Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CI. L. REv. 653, 690-92 (1975). One federal
court has already ruled it a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 for a
law school to administer its financial aid program in such a way as to accord an
automatic preference to applicants from self-perpetuating racial underclasses. Flana-
gan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 45 U.S.L.W. 2067 (D.D.C. July
28, 1976).
149. 18 Cal. 3d at 62, 553 P.2d at 1171, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
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special admissions program, and not merely one presented by
those applicants who are economically disadvantaged. By defi-
nition, the university's problem necessarily contains a racial
dimension and likewise each and every effective alternative
must address that dimension before it can be deemed an
alternative capable of solving that problem. Thus, without
manipulating them severely, the unrealistic and ineffective leg-
islative substitutes offered by the Bakke majority cannot be
accepted as reasonable but less restrictive legislative alterna-
tives to the medical school's special admissions program.
In the course of rendering its decision, the Bakke court
tacitly admitted that it ignored and was not even attempting
to solve the same problem with its alternatives as the racially-
conditioned one attacked by the medical school through its
special admissions program. When delivering its summary
appraisal of its proposed nonracial alternatives the court ad-
mitted that:
Whether these [alternative] measures, taken to-
gether, will result in the enrollment of precisely the same
number of minority students as under the current special
admission program, no one can determine. It may be that
in some years there would be fewer and in some years more
minorities enrolled than under the present scheme.'
The court says nothing about eradicating self-perpetuating
underclasses which, by definition, are racial in Bakke. The
revealing point is that the court admitted that it does not know
whether its proferred alternatives are really alternatives at all
in the sense of actually achieving the state's admittedly com-
pelling ends, but nevertheless, the court was sure that it sub-
stantively wanted to rule out racial preferences in medical
school admissions. In doing so, the court brushed aside a care-
ful application of the more traditional sense of the reasonable
but less restrictive alternative test-as a search for legislative
alternatives-while avowing that what it was applying was
that test in its traditional legislative form. It also ignored the
central purpose of the fourteenth amendment, as well as one
of the more important strictures of the United States Supreme
Court concerning the proper judicial application of the less
restrictive alternative test-that "the Constitution does not
require the state to choose ineffectual means to achieve its
aims."'
150. Id. at 55-56, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
151. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
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Finally, by using the strict scrutiny standard of review and
by assuming the state's ends to be compelling, the Bakke ma-
jority placed the burden of showing that no reasonable alterna-
tive existed to the medical school's use of a racial classification
on the university and then held that the university failed to
carry that burden, having not "established that the Special
Admission program is the least intrusive or even the most effec-
tive means to achieve [its] goal."' 2 In so ruling, the court
deliberately ignored the record made in the trial court, as was
pointed out by Justice Tobriner in dissent:
Moreover, although the majority conclude that the
medical school failed to demonstrate the unavailability of
alternatives, the only evidence in the present record on this
point is the admission committee chairman's statement
that, "in the judgment of the faculty of the Davis Medical
School, the special admissions program is the only method
whereby the school can produce a diverse student body
which will include qualified students from disadvantaged
backgrounds. . . . [Tlhere would be few, if any black
students and few Mexican-American, Indian or Orientals
from disadvantaged backgrounds in the Davis Medical
School or any other medical school, if the special admis-
sions program and similar programs at other schools did
not exist. . . ." (Italics added.) The majority simply re-
ject this unimpeached statement out-of-hand, and, with-
out any support from the record, suggest a number of alter-
natives which on their face are either disingenuous or im-
practical or both.'
Two conclusions stand above all others. First, when judg-
ing the adequacy of its quest for a "reasonable legislative
alternative," the California Supreme Court is to be criticized
because it proceeded by supposition, speculation, surmise and
just plain guesswork, rather than by a carefully reasoned, pro-
bative and studied inquiry. Second, if one rules out disingen-
uous and candorless alternatives to the use of a racial prefer-
ence, then the means suggested by the court must also be ruled
out as alternatives.
The Bakke court also failed to correctly apply the reason-
able alternative test in its second sense. The court's reliance
on Dunn suggests that the court may have intended to apply
the reasonable alternative test in the second sense. However,
152. 18 Cal. 3d at 56, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
153. Id. at 89, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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Dunn is inapposite and the application by the Bakke court of
the test used in Dunn is clearly erroneous.
It is significant that the Bakke majority expressly and
solely relied on Dunn but that it nowhere identified Bakke's
use of racial classification as "too attenuated." The Bakke
court had to ignore this decisive aspect of Dunn because the
university had selected a means that was clearly directly re-
lated and congruent with the state's compelling ends. The criti-
cal concept in Dunn is that as state-chosen means move away
from a congruent relationship with the state's end, a point is
reached where it is proper for a court to hold the means "too
attenuated" in a case where other state laws also achieve the
state's ends. Obviously, this was not, and could not be, at issue
in Bakke.
Neither can it be maintained that existing laws suffi-
ciently promote the compelling ends so as to make the
classification under scrutiny unnecessary. There is no alterna-
tive law existing in California that currently achieves the uni-
versity's substantive end in Bakke, as the voter registration
laws and and those prohibiting voter fraud alternatively
achieved the state's end of ballot-box purity in Dunn.'54 This
is obvious in light of the fact that the classification at issue in
Bakke was designed to break down groups identified as self-
perpetuating racial underclasses. Their very existence is testi-
mony to the inadequacy of existing laws to accomplish the ends
sought by the use of racially based preferential admissions
standards.
It has been shown that the Bakke court did not use the
reasonable but less restrictive test in either of its methods of
application. The alternative means offered by the court will not
achieve the same ends sought by the university. Furthermore,
the court's reliance on Dunn, with the implicit suggestion that
the court was using the test in its contextual sense, has been
shown to be illusory. This indicates that the court's analysis
was not restricted to scrutinizing the means which were
adopted by the university. The conclusion is inescapable that
the substantive end sought to be achieved by the university's
special admissions program is simply ruled out by the Bakke
court as one that the state is constitutionally prohibited from
achieving.
The California Supreme Court's misuse of the reasonable
154. See note 134 supra.
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but less restrictive alternative test conceals the fact that in its
judgment the ends sought in Bakke are less than compelling.
It is apparently the court's view that the interests of the few
applicants who are denied admission because of the special
admissions program at the university outweigh the state's in-
terest in eliminating self-perpetuating racial underclasses. The
Bakke court's conclusion is directly opposite to the holding of
DeFunis but is cloaked in a misleading analysis of the require-
ment of necessity. This interpretation of Bakke is shared by
Justice Tobriner, who states in dissent: "In the end the major-
ity alternatively defend their holding on the ground that, while
there are many laudable objectives served by the special ad-
missions program 'there are more forceful policy reasons
against preferential admissions based on race.' ,','
SPECIAL ADMISSIONS PROGRAM AFTER BAKKE
The California Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized
"that we do not compel the University to utilize only 'the high-
est objective academic credentials' as the criterion for admis-
sion." 5 It expressly approved the use of "flexible admission
standards"'57 and expressly ruled that "the University may
properly as it in fact does, consider other factors [than grades
and admission test scores] in evaluating an applicant, such as
the personal interview, recommendations, character, and mat-
ters relating to the needs of the profession and society, such as
an applicant's professional goals."' 58 In addition to the factors
stated by the court, the university, in its regular and in its
special admissions procedures, also considered an applicant's
"extracurricular and community acitivities, a history of the
applicants's work experience, and his personal comments."' 55
For both the regular and the specially admitted students, the
university then created
155. 18 Cal. 3d at 90, 553 P.2d at 1190-91, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
156. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694. The court's position is
supported by a number of articles which point out that a cultural bias is implicit in
traditional medical school admission criteria. See, e.g., Marshall, Minority Students
for Medicine and the Hazards of High School, 48 J. MED. ED. 134 (1973); Nelson,
Expanding Educational Opportuunities in Medicine for Blacks and Other Minority
Students, 45 J. MED. ED. 731 (1970); Whittico, The Medical School Dilemma, 61
A.M.A.J. 185 (1969).
159. 18 Cal. 3d at 40, 553 P.2d at 1156, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
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a combined numerical rating . . . based upon an assess-
ment of the applicant derived from information in his ap-
plication, his letters of recommendation, the interview
summary, test scores and grade point average, as well as a
consideration of his motivation, character, imagination,
and the type and locale of the practice he anticipates en-
tering in the future.'
Except for the sole factor of the use of the racial classifica-
tion, the California Supreme Court expressly ruled that "the
standards for admission employed by the university are not
constitutionally infirm"'' and that the medical school "is enti-
tled to consider . . . that low grades and test scores may not
accurately reflect the abilities of some disadvantaged stu-
dents" and "may reasonably conclude that. . . their potential
for success in the school and the profession is equal to or greater
than that of an applicant who has not been similarly handi-
capped."'' 2 Thus, it appears that the Bakke court would allow
an affirmative action program of considerable scope for
"disadvantaged" applicants, so long as it did not use a racial
classification. It also appears that the court, without actually
characterizing it as such, finally allowed for the creation of a
valid, nonracial alternative which would permit the university
to solve the real problem that it had originally attacked with
its special admissions program. That judicially unacknow-
ledged alternative is disingenuous and candorless, but can be
effective.' 3
160. Id. at 42, 553 P.2d at 1157, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 685. This appears proper
because there appears to be a lack of correlation between academic performance,
whether judged by undergraduate or medical school grade point, and later physican
performances. See Price, Measurement of Physician Performance, 39 J. MED. ED. 203
(1964). See generally Haley & Lerner, The Characteristics and Performance of Medical
Students During Preclinical Training, 47 J. MED. ED. 446 (1972); Rhoades, Motivation,
Medical School Admissions, and Student Performance, 49 J. MED. ED. 1119 (1974);
Turner, Predictions of Clinical Performance, 49 J. MED. ED. 338 (1974).
161. 18 Cal. 3d at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
162. Id. at 54, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
163. Writing a year before the Bakke decision, Professor Greenawalt presented
the argument that racially preferential admissions program might be advantageously
pursued if they were concealed behind broad racially neutral admissions criteria. This
type of analysis might explain, at least in part, the Bakke majority's willingness to
disallow the use of racially based criteria. Professor Greenawalt wrote:
Thus far I have assumed that an open weighing of constitutional
values is to be desired in this area, as in most others. That is at least
debatable. Consider the following position: Preferences for blacks are
badly needed to alleviate black alienation and to create genuine equality
of opportunity. But upper middle class liberal whites who make the deci-
sions about preference will suffer a crisis of conscience if they have to
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In short, through the use of the loose and vague admissions
criteria approved by the Bakke court, everything depends on
what one specifically counts as a handicap and on the amount
of points assigned to that handicap. This alternative can be
manipulated into just about anything one wants. For example,
if overcoming the handicap of having been raised in a core-city
barrio or ghetto, or on a reservation, were deemed to reveal
character, and/or motivation, and/or imagination and were also
worth an additional 100 points, added to a medical applicant's
combined numerical rating score, or if 100 points were added
for an applicant's statement that he intended to practice medi-
cine in a core-city barrio or ghetto, or on a reservation, and that
statement were considered for its reliability of commitment
against the background of an applicant's life experience, then
clearly many disadvantaged Chicanos, blacks and American
Indians could be produced under the court's approved admis-
sions standards."4 This disingenuous and candorless alterna-
tive obviously can be made into an expressly nonracial, legisla-
tive substitute for the university's special admissions program
which will achieve the same ends as its racially-conditioned
admit they are favoring some racial groups at the expense of others and
at the expense of criteria of individual merit. The poorer whites who have
relatively few social opportunities will certainly resent such a policy very
strongly. These effects can be partly avoided if an essentially racial pref-
erence is clothed in the polite language of "cultural disadvantage" and if
the policy, whether explicitly racial or not, is based on the need for a
"more sensitive assessment of qualifications" and a "diverse student
body," politically the most noncontroversial justifications for preference.
The broader harmful effects of announced and judicially approved racial
preferences can be avoided if preference is accomplished under the cover
of some apparently more open policy, or at least justified on the most
noncontroversial grounds. There will be less encouragement to whites to
think in racial terms; and blacks who enter law school may feel less that
they are there because they happened to be black.
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 601 (1975); cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974) (upholding an employment preference for American Indians in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs while characterizing American Indians as a "political," not a "racial,"
group).
164. The medical school need not worry that this would open the floodgates,
producing a surfeit of disadvantaged students. Intangibles such as intensity of imagi-
nation, strength of motivation and reliability of character might be used as criteria
and provide a basis for various rankings of disadvantaged applicants. Thus, while
Bakke most likely precludes the medical school from using its quota of sixteen for
disadvantaged applicants (18 Cal. 3d at 62-63, 553 P.2d at 171-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
699-70) by concealing its racially preferential admissions program behind vague ra-
cially neutral formuli, the medical school should be able to annually admit sixteen, or
so, first-year medical students from self-perpetuating racial underclasses.
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preferential admissions system for disadvantaged but qualified
applicants.
It can be-everything depends upon what set of charac-
teristics are counted as handicaps and the values assigned.
But, even so, the transparency of the progress is patently ob-
vious. By what objective criteria does one say what really
should count as a nonracial handicap? Of course, no one truly
knows how to weigh and quantify nonracial handicaps. For
example, consider whether the following handicaps qualify as
admissions standards and how much weight they should carry:
having been raised in poverty in a barrio or city ghetto or reser-
vation; having a home life where parents spoke broken or no
Engish; not having sufficient money to go to a prestigious uni-
versity and have to attend a local community college instead;
having to work while attending a lower ranked college; having
been raised by only one parent; having participated in intercol-
legiate athletics or student government rather than having
studied those additional hours; having alcoholic but affluent
upperclass parents; having been prohibited by wealthy parents
from participating in intercollegiate sports, from working part
time, from attending public schools or from having conversa-
tions with riff-raff. Obviously this alternative can collapse into
a hopeless morass of arbitrariness; yet, apparently, it was ap-
proved in principle by the California Supreme Court.
The Bakke court clearly wanted to approve the admission
of persons who are qualified but disadvantaged. But, it failed
to give adequate guidance. The court has now shifted the locus
of decision making to the university. It should feel free to
adopt any careful and reasonable program worked out on edu-
cational grounds that is designed to admit disadvantaged ap-
plicants, so long as it does not use a racial classification, re-
membering, however, that when defining disadvantage one of
the noblest elements of American tradition is the uplifting of
downtrodden, self-perpetuating underclasses. In this light, it
should be clearly understood that a careful study by the uni-
versity of its own previously admitted applicants who are aca-
demically qualified but disadvantaged and come from the self-
perpetuating racial underclasses that previously were favored
in its special admissions program, should yield a set of non-
racial criteria functionally equivalent to that expressed by its
previous use of a racial classification, and be equally substitut-
able for it.
In using its new racially neutral admissions criteria, with
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its disadvantaged aspects, the university will be using admis-
sions standards that are racially neutral on their faces; thus,
no suspect classification would be involved. Since most likely
there is no fundamental constitutional right to higher educa-
tion, " 5 it would, therefore, be most difficult for a litigating
plaintiff to induce a court to invoke either the strict scrutiny
or the substantial interest standard of fourteenth amendment
review. That leaves only the rational basis test as the standard
of review, and no unversity burden of showing the absence of a
reasonable alternative to its nonracial admissions program.
Thus, in final and summary appraisal of Bakke with its im-
plied approval of the unacknowledged, disingenuous, candor-
less but effective alternative, it can be said that "what the left
hand giveth the right hand taketh away."
165. See notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text supra.

